Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030: The Discussion Continues With Delays
Event
On 27 July, Draft Law № 15230-d on the approval of the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 was registered in the Verkhovna Rada. The draft represents a revised version of the earlier drafts entitled “On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030” (Reg. №№ 15230, 15230-1 and 15230-2).
The Strategy is intended to implement measure № 2 under Strategic Result № 1 of Subsection 2.1 (“Fight against Corruption”) of the Rule of Law Roadmap, approved by Cabinet of Ministers Resolution № 475-r of 14 May 2025. Its adoption is aimed at ensuring the further development and systematization of Ukraine’s anti-corruption policy framework within the context of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. Under the Ukraine Facility Plan, the anti-corruption strategy and accompanying programme were to be adopted by the end of June 2026.
CPLR’s assessment
A key concern regarding the previous drafts of the Anti-Corruption Strategy was the Government’s removal of several important provisions linked to Ukraine’s EU integration commitments without any explanation. Draft Law № 15230-d addresses many of these concerns by reinstating a number of previously excluded provisions and introducing additional measures.
1. Compared to earlier versions, Draft Law No. 15230-d revises Problem 1.10.3 concerning the independence and institutional capacity of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).
Notably, the draft introduces several expected strategic results that were absent from previous versions. These include the adoption, by no later than 2030, of law granting the Head of SAPO the authority to enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations concerning the possible commission of a criminal offence by a Member of Parliament; approve motions subject to review by an investigating judge, in line with Benchmark 23.6 under Cluster 1 “Fundamentals of the EU Accession Process”; and extend pre-trial investigation deadlines.
The draft also restores SAPO’s authority to independently carry out other necessary investigative and procedural actions in all criminal proceedings falling within NABU’s jurisdiction.
2. The draft introduces a new problem 2.1.10, which addresses the insufficient financial and human resources of courts and other institutions within the justice system. Among the expected strategic results is the establishment of a sustainable framework for providing courts and justice sector institutions with adequate financial and human resources. This includes ensuring competitive levels of remuneration for judges and salaries for court staff and employees of other justice institutions, taking into account workload, the significance of their functions, and the level of responsibility they bear.
3. A new problem 2.1.11, which concerns inadequate regulatory and organizational framework for the functioning of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC). The expected strategic results include: introducing single-judge consideration of civil and administrative cases by the HACC; ensuring that proceedings can continue where one of the three judges on a HACC or HACC Appeals Chamber panel is replaced; achieving a more balanced distribution of cases among HACC judges; and ensuring proper conditions for the administration of justice by the HACC, including by filling vacant judicial positions and providing permanent premises for judges at both first-instance and appellate levels, as well as for court staff.
4. The revised version reinstates, in a shortened form, a provision under problem 2.2.2 addressing the risks of undue informal or political influence in the existing procedure for the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General. The expected strategic results include establishing a more transparent and merit-based appointment procedure for the Prosecutor General, in line with Benchmark 23.2 under Cluster 1 “Fundamentals of the EU Accession Process”.
5. Under problem 2.2.7, the draft provides for a gradual transition to filling senior positions in the National Police of Ukraine, including in its central and territorial bodies, exclusively through competitive selection procedures involving independent experts.
6. New problem 2.2.9 has been introduced, addressing the insufficient level of institutional independence of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the lack of clarity in the scope of its investigative jurisdiction, which create risks of undue influence and inefficient use of resources. Among the expected strategic results is the establishment of a mechanism for comprehensive institutional and personnel reform of the SBI.
The timely adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy is essential for fulfilling Ukraine’s international commitments, including those under the Ukraine Facility, and for supporting the implementation of the Rule of Law Roadmap. CPLR expects the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 to be considered through a constructive and substantive process.
The New Government Supports Granting the Customs Service Powers to Conduct Pre-Trial Investigations
Event
On 29 July, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine submitted a new draft Customs Code (Reg. № 15450) to the Verkhovna Rada as one of its first legislative initiatives.
The draft aims to align Ukraine’s customs legislation with the EU Customs Code and other relevant EU legal acts, while also extending the requirements of the Law of Ukraine “On Administrative Procedure” to customs relations, as set out in the Public Administration Reform Roadmap.
At the same time, the draft Code (as did the previous version of the draft Customs Code, Reg. № 15295) envisions the establishment of “specialized law enforcement units” within the State Customs Service, with detectives empowered to conduct operational-search activities and carry out pre-trial investigations into smuggling offences.
CPLR’s assessment
CPLR experts have previously criticized this government initiative, expressing reservations about the proposal to transform the State Customs Service from an inspection and administrative body into an additional pre-trial investigation authority.
Such a fundamental change to the law enforcement architecture is not envisaged by Ukraine’s strategic documents on European integration — including the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, and the European Commission’s Enlargement Report — or by key criminal justice reform documents, including the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for Reforming Law Enforcement Bodies as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027. Furthermore, this proposal has not been subject to broad expert discussion on the merits and potential implications of such a step.
The only sector-specific policy document, the National Revenue Strategy until 2030, links the criminalization of liability for the illegal movement of goods, introduced by the 2023 Law, with a proposal to empower customs authorities to conduct operational-search activities and pre-trial investigations into smuggling offences.
The government initiative would effectively curtail the powers of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, which currently investigates criminal offences related to smuggling under Articles 201-3 and 201-4 of the Criminal Code. Such a move could be considered inconsistent with Ukraine’s EU integration commitments, as one of the EU membership benchmarks requires Ukraine to demonstrate tangible progress in further strengthening the capacity, institutional status, and independence of the Economic Security Bureau (IBM 24.7.4).
The draft Code contradicts the logic and trajectory of law enforcement reforms pursued in recent decades, a key element of which has been ensuring the institutional independence of pre-trial investigation bodies. The adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine” in 2021 and the establishment of the Bureau as a separate central executive body outside the tax and customs authorities represented the implementation of the 2008 Concept for Reforming Ukraine’s Criminal Justice System. The Concept provided that, in order to conduct pre-trial investigations into tax, financial, and customs crimes and criminal misdemeanours, the tax police should be separated from the State Tax Service and transformed into an independent criminal justice body.
By contrast, the establishment of specialized law enforcement units within the State Customs Service to conduct pre-trial investigations into smuggling would reverse the course of institutional reform and effectively return to a model abandoned two decades ago, when customs authorities maintained their own inquiry units.
The lack of a systemic approach in this legislative proposal is further evidenced by the fact that granting the State Customs Service full pre-trial investigation powers would require amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code — amendments that have not been prepared by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
The creation of a separate body (or dedicated unit) to investigate a single category of offences — smuggling — is also unjustified from a financial and institutional perspective, particularly during a special period marked by martial law and post-war recovery needs. This is especially problematic given that an existing institution — the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine — already has the mandate and capacity to perform these functions effectively. No separate law enforcement bodies have ever been created to investigate only one or two, even particularly serious, types of crimes.
Урядовий проект також скасовує новації в роботі Митної служби, запроваджені Законом від 2024 року. Йдеться про участь представників міжнародних партнерів з вирішальним голосом у роботі конкурсної комісії з відбору керівника митної служби, Комісії з зовнішнього оцінювання роботи служби, Дисциплінарного комітету.
The government’s draft Code would also roll back key institutional safeguards for the Customs Service introduced by the 2024 legislation. These include the involvement of international partners’ representatives with decisive voting rights in the commission responsible for selecting the Head of the Customs Service, the Commission for External Evaluation of the Service’s performance, and the Disciplinary Committee.